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“Free trade assumes that if you throw men out of work in one direction you 
re-employ them in another. As soon as that link is broken the whole of the 
free-trade argument breaks down” (J. M. Keynes, evidence to the Macmillan 
Committee on Finance and Industry, 1930). 
 
Like Gresham’s Law, “alternative facts” drive out facts.
1
 If the economics profession had not 
decided long ago that the argument to be made here is wrong, we might not have President 
Trump.
2
 We might not even have the deep cause of his success – the angry, indignant mood 
infecting swathes of western electorates.   
  
Most of the 63 million Trump voters (47 percent of those who voted) express anger and 
indignation at elites who have been shredding the bargain on which complex democracies 
rest. They see those elites as taking a share of income and wealth beyond any plausible 
measure of social value, squeezing the last cent out of their workers or customers, and 
seeming to care little for the insecurities thrown up by technology and globalization. Of total 
employment growth in the US between 2005 and 2015, insecure employment in the 
categories of independent contractors, on-call workers and workers provided by contracting 
companies or temp agencies accounted for fully 94 percent.
3
  Outsourcing of employment 
plays a big role in what David Weil describes as the “fissuring” of the workplace – depressing 
wages, magnifying income and wealth inequality, and generating a pervasive sense on the 
part of those at the wrong end of the fissuring that the world is cheating them, making them 
angry in return.
4
  On top of this, many Trump voters are angry that the government is giving 
handouts to “shirkers”, and sticking them with the tax bill.    
                                                          
1
 Thanks to Adrian Wood for this sentence and a version of the next one.   
2
 Trump also surfed on widespread perception that the political system is illegitimate. The latter 
perception is substantiated by surveys of thousands of election experts asked to assess the quality of 
hundreds of elections around the world, whose average put the US as 52
nd
 among 153 countries on 
“electoral integrity”, as reported by the Electoral Integrity Project. Reported in Eduardo Porter, 2017, 
“Dysfunction in U.S. democracy”, New York Times (International), January 5. US voting turnout is one of 
the lowest in the developed world. In 2016 232 million citizens were legally entitled to vote; only 132 
million did so (57%).   
3
 Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger, 2016, “The rise and nature of alternative work arrangements in the 
US, 1995-2015”, March 29. By the end of 2015, workers in the authors ‘alternative’ employment 
constituted 16 percent of total workers.  
4
 David Weil, 2014, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad For So Many and What Can 
Be Done To Improve It, Harvard University Press.  
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They now see themselves as, finally, members of a winning team (“we won, you lost, get 
used to it!”). They affirm their leader’s strikes against pillars of the “establishment” order 
(including the media and even the judiciary), and they forgive the administration’s lies, 
“alternative facts”, authoritarianism, chauvinism, and billionaire composition at the top.
5
   
 
But we should not understand Trump’s victory as a sui generis case. It fits the larger pattern 
in the developed world whereby financial crises tend to empower the far-Right in their wake.  
A recent study by Michael Funke and colleagues examines political effects of financial crises 
in 20 developed countries over the past 140 years and 800 elections. They find:  
 
1) government majorities shrink after a financial crisis, political polarization increases;  
2) policy uncertainty increases;  
3) voters tend to be drawn to the far-Right, which typically attributes blame to foreigners 
or minorities; on average, vote share of far-Right parties increases by 30% after 
financial crises;  these effects are much stronger after financial crises than after 
‘normal’ recessions or macroeconomic shocks that are not financial.
6
 
 
The study suggests that the current wave of electoral support for “populist” leaders and 
parties in the US and much of Europe is a lagged response to the disruptions of 2008 and the 
drawn-out Great Recession. One might infer from it a bias for hope that the current far-Right 
wave will subside… if “normal” growth resumes and/or if governments undertake more pre- 
and re-distribution. The bias for hope is all the stronger when one remembers that Mr Trump 
attracted around three million votes less than Hillary Clinton; and that, so far, the far-Right 
forces in Europe have come close to governmental power only when allied with conventional 
Center-Right parties.    
 
The elite response to President Trump is of course very different from the mass response. 
Philip Stephens of the Financial Times reports on foreign elite reaction: “A first take from 
friendly foreign ministries is that Mr Trump’s economic nationalism threatens to fracture the 
open international trade system.”  This is the climactic sign of “a rogue American president” 
who “will prove a force for dangerous instability”.
7
    
 
Here, without getting into Trumpian specifics, I make a partial defense of President Trump’s 
skepticism about the virtues of ever freer trade, ever more economic integration between 
countries.
8
  My bottom line is that “the open international trade system” does need adjustment 
                                                          
5
 On the billionaire composition, The Financial Times reported (“Tillerson in line for $180m if confirmed”, 
5 January 2017, p.4) that Rex Tillerson, Donald Trump’s secretary of state, will be given a payout worth 
about $180m to sever all financial ties to Exxon Mobil, because before his selection, the Exxon 
chairman and chief executive was in line to receive about 2 million shares in the oil group, worth about 
$182 m at today’s prices. Mr Tillerson might consider himself hard done by compared to Stephen 
Schwarzman, the chief executive of Blackstone Group, the leveraged buyout firm, appointed by Mr 
Trump to be head of the president’s business council. Schwarzman was paid $799 million in 2015.  On 
lies and ‘alternative facts’, G. Grassegger and M. Krogerus, 2017, “The data that turned the world 
upside down”, Motherboard, 28 January, at https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/how-our-likes-
helped-trump-win argue that they were not shoot-from-the-hip; they were carefully planned and micro-
targeted on the basis of Big Data analysis of Facebook and other such data about individuals.     
6
 M. Funke, M. Schularick, C. Trebesch, 2016, “Going to extremes: politics after financial crises, 1870-
2014”, European Economic Review, at  
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292116300587    
7
 P. Stephens, 2017, “What the world hears from the White House”, Financial Times, January 27, p.13. 
8
 David Brooks of The New York Times warns that one should not take Trump’s policy gestures 
seriously.  “When Trump issues a statement, it may look superficially like a policy statement, but it’s 
usually just a symbolic assault in some dominance-submission male rivalry game… His statements 
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to provide more “policy space” for national governments and regional blocs. “Cooperative 
internationalism” should be the goal, not the prevailing “integrative globalization” – which 
relies on multilateral institutions and American hegemony to glue the world together and 
prescribes that  national governments should have no more influence over trade and other 
cross-border movements than US states or even EU states have over theirs.
 9
     
 
  
I. The elite globalization consensus  
 
In this context globalization refers to the opening of domestic markets and the integration of 
global production via multinational corporations (MNCs). More broadly, it refers to  movement 
in the world economy towards “one country”, or “deep (not shallow) integration”, where nation 
states have no more influence over flows of goods, services, capital, finance, ideas and 
people across borders than South Dakota or the other US states have across theirs. Ever 
since the 1980s leaders of western states – including shareholders and top executives of 
MNCs – have agreed that states, on their own and cooperating (in free trade agreements, and 
in inter-state organizations like the World Bank, IMF, World Trade Organization, European 
Union), should push for ever more globalization, more “market access” for their corporations, 
and less state “intervention” or “regulation” in markets.  
 
Here is Martin Wolf of the Financial Times, one of the world’s most influential economic 
commentators:  
 
“It cannot make sense to fragment the world economy more than it already is 
but rather to make the world economy work as if it were the United States, or 
at least the European Union… The failure of our world is not that there is too 
much globalization, but that there is too little. The potential for greater 
economic integration is barely tapped… Social democrats, classical liberals 
and democratic conservatives should unite to preserve and improve the 
liberal global economy against the enemies mustering both outside and 
inside the gates” (emphasis added).
10
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
should probably be treated less like policy declarations and more like Snapchat. They exist to win 
attention at the moment, but then they disappear… The crucial question of the Trump administration 
could be: Who will fill the void left by a leader who is all façade?”  David Brooks, 2017. “The Snapchat 
presidency”, New York Times, 4 January. 
9
 Disclosure: I have a dog in this fight. I worked in the Trade Policy Division of the World Bank in the late 
1980s. In the evenings and at weekends I worked on finishing my book, Governing the Market, 
Princeton University Press, 1990, 2004 – a project entirely separate from the Bank. But given my broad 
knowledge of East Asia the division asked me to write a substantial paper about how East Asian 
countries had gone about promoting exports. I agreed, but added that I would also have to discuss how 
they had gone about substituting imports, because export promotion and import substitution were like 
the two wings of the same bird. Emphatic no, was the response; import substitution could only be 
mentioned in negatives. Shortly after, I left the Bank for the more honest climate of the US Congress’ 
Office of Technology Assessment.  See Wade, 2009, “Reflections: Robert Wade, interviewed by Alex 
Izurieta”, Development and Change, v.40, n.6, November, p.1153-1190.  See also Wade, 1993, 
“Managing trade: Taiwan and South Kora as challenges to economics and political science”, 
Comparative Politics, 25, 2, January, p.147-168, which gives a more extended economic and political 
analysis of the trade regime of Taiwan and South Korea than in Governing the Market.  Also, Wade, 
2014, “Current thinking about global trade policy”, Economic and Political Weekly, XLIX, 6, February 8, 
p.18-21,   gives an account of current thinking about global trade policy (especially in the context of the 
Sustainable Development Goals), by way of showing how most of UNCTAD (but not the division which 
produces the Trade and Development Report) has been captured by those who give top priority to 
“trade facilitation”, code for almost free trade. 
10
 M. Wolf, 2004, Why Globalization Works, Yale University Press, p.4. 
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Here is Renarto Ruggiero, former head of the WTO:  
 
“trade integration is not just a recipe for growth but also security and peace, 
as history has shown” (emphasis added).   
 
Here is the WTO saying on its website: global integration under WTO and predecessor GATT 
supervision  
 
“has been one of the greatest contributors to economic growth and the relief 
of poverty in mankind’s history” (emphasis added). 
 
Here is the World Bank summarizing others’ research findings, with which it agrees:   
 
“openness to international trade, based on largely neutral incentives, was the 
critical factor in East Asia’s rapid growth” (emphasis added).
11
 
 
The World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Loans over the 1980s carried more trade 
liberalization conditions than those in any other policy domain. The Bank treated trade 
liberalization as the queen of policies, not just one among many, saying that free trade policy 
will limit the amount of damage from other government interventions in the market.
12
 
 
The Financial Times peppers its editorials about trade protection with negatives like 
“mercantilist” and “populist”, and stresses that any one country benefits from adopting free 
trade policy even if others do not – because protection amounts to throwing rocks in your own 
harbor. Apparently the collective interest of any country and of the world at large always 
favors free trade, because free trade maximizes the size of the pie. Only self-seeking “vested 
interests” want protection in order to get more of the pie for themselves, at inevitable cost to 
society.  
 
A big business voice comes from Percy Barnevik, when CEO of the Swedish-Swiss 
multinational Asea Brown Boveri (ABB):  
 
“I would define globalization as the freedom of my group to invest where and 
as long as it wishes, to produce what it wishes, by buying and selling 
wherever it wishes… while putting up with as little labor laws and social 
convention constraints as possible.” 
13
  
 
Finally, Bernard Arnault, in 2000, CEO of French luxury group LVMH and 10
th
 richest person 
on Earth:  
 
“Businesses, especially international ones, have ever greater resources, and 
in Europe they have acquired the ability to compete with states… Politicians’ 
real impact on the economic life of a country is more and more limited. 
Fortunately.”
14
  
                                                          
11
 World Bank, 1993, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, p. 292.  
12
 World Bank, 1989, “Strengthening trade policy reform”, Washington DC, November 13. 
13
 Quoted in J. Gelinas, 2003, Juggernaut Politics: Understanding Predatory Capitalism, Zed Books,  
p. 21 
14
 B. Arnault, quoted in Serge Halimi, 2013, “Tyranny of the one per cent”, Le Monde Diplomatique 
(English), May 1.  
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These statements illustrate the tendency for globalization champions to attribute “all good 
things” to trade and investment integration, including (1) global poverty reduction on an 
unprecedented scale, (2) East Asia’s remarkable economic rise, and (3) global peace and 
security.  
 
Though they assert causality, the statements are not intended to pass a test of evidence.  
Their job is to affirm identity: that the speaker or organization is a member of the global elite 
team which wants capital, goods and services to be able to move freely worldwide between 
locations and sectors, as the defining feature of desirable globalization, assuming that what is 
good for the team is good for humanity and the biosphere.  
 
Implicitly or explicitly the claims downplay the value of “policy space” and the value of the 
solidarity obligations embedded in the idea of “nation”, ignoring the employment point made 
by Keynes in the epigraph. The claims should be understood in the light of Daniel 
Kahneman’s observation, “Declarations of high confidence mainly tell you that an individual 
has constructed a coherent story in his mind, not necessarily that the story is true”.  
 
 
II. Comparative advantage and free trade as the crown jewel of the neoclassical 
paradigm  
 
Globalization champions draw comfort from neoclassical economic theory, which purports to 
give a rigorous and “general interest” justification for the policy of free trade in goods and 
services.
15
  
 
The argument today rests on basically the same theory of comparative advantage as David 
Ricardo proposed in 1817 – a theory which was static, timeless, abstract, elegant, and which 
today broadly retains those characteristics (with some  theoretical qualifications to do with 
“increasing returns”,  which are treated as unimportant for practical policy in the real world). In 
the following two centuries the theory acquired the status of jewel in the crown of the 
increasingly dominant neoclassical paradigm.    
 
As Paul Krugman quipped,   
 
“If there were an Economist’s Creed, it would surely contain the affirmations, 
‘I understand the Principle of Comparative Advantage’ and ‘I advocate Free 
Trade.’”
16
 
 
Gregory Mankiw, author of the most widely used textbook in economics, declared,  
 
“Although economists often disagree on questions of policy, they are united in 
their support of free trade. Moreover, the central argument for free trade has 
not changed much in the past two centuries… [E]conomists’ opposition to 
trade restrictions is still based largely on the principle of comparative 
advantage.”
17
 
                                                          
15
 Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel give a measured account of the mainstream theory, its strengths 
and weaknesses, in Reclaiming Development: An Alternative Economic Policy Manual, 2014, Zed 
Books, London. 
16
 Paul Krugman, 1987, “Is free trade passé?”, J. Economic Perspectives 1 (2) Fall,  p. 131.   
17
 N. Gregory Mankiw, 2008, Principles of Economics, 5
th
 ed., Mason: Thompson,   p. 57 
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Jagdish Bhagwati, celebrated trade economist at Columbia University, put the point more 
colorfully:  
 
“Only Neanderthals among the economists now militate against free trade: 
unfortunately, they will never lack an audience but fortunately, they have little 
effect presently”.
18
  
 
Finally, Douglas Irwin, historian of economic ideas: 
 
“…one should recognize that free trade commands respect among 
economists largely because of its continuing theoretical attractiveness” 
(rooted in the theory of comparative advantage).
19
 
  
Surveys of economists’ opinions confirm that there is nothing that economists, especially 
American economists, agree about more than the virtues of free or almost free trade. For 
example, a survey of nearly 1,000 economists in five industrialized countries asked them to 
“generally agree”, “agree with provisos”, or  “generally disagree” with 27 propositions. “Tariffs 
and import controls lower economic welfare” was the one that elicited most agreement.  
Seventy nine percent of the American economists and 57 percent of the whole sample said, 
“generally agree”.
20
 
  
 
III. The argument for free trade policy 
 
The argument boils down to three propositions supporting the conclusion that the institution of 
free trade is ‘right’ for each country and the world.  
 
1) Free trade leads to production specialization in activities in which the economy holds 
a “comparative or relative advantage” (not “absolute advantage”);  
2) This pattern of production specialization yields maximum efficiency of resource 
allocation among the trading partners, and therefore maximum “welfare” for these 
trading countries; 
3) Economists should recommend policy measures which will result in maximum 
efficiency (including free trade) and leave it to political choice as to how to distribute 
the resulting maximum income or consumption.   
 
The basic idea is simple. People want to consume a wider mix than can be produced at home 
more cheaply than could be imported. Therefore, driven by relative costs, countries tend to 
export goods whose production makes intensive use of resources or factors (including land, 
labour, skilled labour, capital) which are abundant nationally, and import goods whose 
production requires resources scarce nationally. A country with trade barriers blocks this 
efficiency-enhancing mechanism and imposes higher costs of its consumption mix on its 
population (“puts rocks in its own harbor”). A country which lowers its trade barriers tends to 
raise its specialization of production, exports and employment in the resource abundant 
                                                          
18
 Jagdish Bhagwati, 1998, “Free trade: what  now?”, Keynote address at University of St Gallen, May 
25, https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:123560,  p. 8  
19
 Douglas Irwin, 1996,  Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, Princeton University 
Press,  p. 224 
20
 B. Frey, W. Pommerehne, F. Schneider, G. Gilbert, 1984, “Consensus and dissensus among 
economists: an empirical enquiry”, American Economic Review, 74, 5, pp. 986-94. 
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products, so the returns to the abundant resources tend to rise relative to the returns to the 
scarcer resources. Ergo, free trade is best for each country and the world, enabling maximum 
consumption from a given stock of resources.   
 
The argument has more recently been fortified by the fall in “coordination costs” and 
“information costs” thanks to ICTs (information and communication technologies), as well as 
production changes that facilitate the unbundling of production into discrete tasks to be done 
in scattered locations.
21
 These developments enable a country to get better access to 
production, marketing and managerial knowledge than before, and so able to stretch its 
comparative advantage into the export of products previously out of reach.   
 
In the event that imports of a set of products drive a country’s producers out of those 
products, this is all to the good, because the imports reveal that the products in which the 
country holds a comparative advantage have changed. Over time in any one economy, as 
wages and other costs rise, the economy should lose production and jobs in its relatively less 
productive industries to lower cost economies and gain them in its relatively more productive 
industries.    
 
It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that comparative-advantage-driven free trade is the core 
mechanism by which modern mainstream economics explains the great question, how market 
capitalism generates human welfare. Beneficial global integration – moving towards “one 
economic country” – is the overarching narrative of the past several decades. See the earlier 
quotes from Ruggerio, Wolf, and the others, and the results of the survey of economists’ 
opinions.   
 
So both specialists and public discourse writ large are confident that, first, the theory of 
comparative advantage is compelling as an explanation of production specialization and trade 
patterns; second, it is also compelling as the theoretical justification for the policy of free 
trade; and third, the empirical evidence is strong that trade liberalization raises growth rates, 
and that countries with freer trade have better economic performance than countries with less 
free trade.   
 
On these grounds believers dismiss those who advocate some degree of trade management 
with the charge that they are willing to sacrifice the “general interest” (implicitly defined in 
terms of larger consumption, regardless of employment) in order to protect the interests of 
narrow interest groups (such as trade unions, or inefficient small and medium enterprises,  
which typically provide much employment).  
 
 
IV. Free trade in question: the theory is not robust   
 
At a high level of aggregation the theory of comparative advantage “works”, in the sense that 
global trade patterns are broadly in line with its predictions. Countries with abundant land and 
scarce skilled labor (Africa) tend to produce and export land-intensive products and import 
manufactured products, and countries with scarce land and abundant labour (East Asia) tend 
                                                          
21
 Adrian Wood, 2017, “Variations in structural change around the world, 1985-2015: patterns, causes, 
and implications”, WIDER Working Paper 2017/34, United Nations University World Institute for 
Development Economics Research.  
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to produce and export labour-intensive manufactured products and import land-intensive and 
skill-intensive products.
22
   
 
But this is not the end of the story. The theory’s broad consistency with trade patterns does 
not translate straightforwardly into the policy conclusion that free trade is best for each 
country and the world.  The theory rests on a raft of assumptions so limiting of its domain of 
applicability as to make one wonder how it could have survived for so long  as the crown 
jewel of economic theory.  Here are some of them.
23
  
 
No externalities 
 
The theory assumes no externalities; in other words, assumes that prices reflect true 
economic value – including the economic cost of environmental damage and the economic 
gains of one company’s innovation for other companies. The theory is driven only by what is 
included in prices. A country with lax environmental standards will produce and export too 
much of some goods, because prices do not include environmental damage (deaths from 
ambient air pollution, for example); and countries with higher environmental standards will 
import too much relative to prices which do incorporate environmental damage. Less than 
free trade could benefit both sides. Similarly, free trade can lead to companies producing 
positive spillovers for other companies being wiped out by foreign competition, because their 
prices do not reflect their hidden value to others in the same country. Assuming no 
externalities of course limits all free market theory, not just comparative advantage theory.   
 
Full employment is sustained 
 
The theory assumes full employment throughout, ignoring “transitional costs” of increased 
exposure to trade. By assuming full employment, it avoids facing a trade-off between the 
welfare gains from trade and the welfare losses from unemployment or precariate 
employment. See Keynes’ epigraph. Implicitly, the theory sides with consumers, not with 
those whose income from labor (rather than capital) might be threatened by unrestrained 
imports. It is as though the “Walmart effect” of cheap imported consumer goods completely 
eclipses the employment losses associated with rising imports of manufactures (now 
amplified by post-2008 fiscal austerity).  
  
The slowness of labour market “adjustment” to trade shocks – and recessions – than 
assumed in the globalization consensus has been measured by David Autor, David Dorn and 
Gordon Hanson. They study the effects of “the China shock” that began in the early 1990s in 
the form of a surge of manufactured exports to the US. They find that,  
 
“Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are substantial 
adjustment costs and distribution consequences… Adjustment in local labor 
markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation rates 
remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least 
a full decade after the China shock commences… At the national level, 
                                                          
22
 Adrian Wood, 2017, “Variations in structural change around the world, 1985-2015: patterns, causes, 
and implications”.  
23
 This section draws on Ian Fletcher, 2010, Free Trade Doesn’t Work: What Should Replace It and 
Why, U.S. Business and Industry Council, Washington DC;  and  Vishaal  Kishore,  2014,  Ricardo’s 
Gauntlet: Economic Fiction and the Flawed Case for Free Trade,  Anthem Press. Thanks to Adrian 
Wood for comments.  
real-world economics review, issue no. 79 
subscribe for free 
 
51 
 
employment has fallen in U.S. industries more exposed to import competition, 
as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to 
materialize.”
24
 
 
They calculate that about 55 percent of job losses in US manufacturing between 2000 and 
2007 was caused by “rising exposure to Chinese import competition”, and 33 percent in the 
earlier period, 1990–2000.
25
   
 
More evidence on the slowness of labour market adjustment comes from OECD figures on 
unemployment. As of 2015, eight years after the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007-08, 
some 44 million people were unemployed and wanting work in the OECD, 37 percent higher 
than the rate before 2007. The mainstream response prescribes fiscal austerity and job 
retraining. This is like saying – when 100 dogs are ushered into a room where 95 bones have 
been hidden and five emerge without a bone – “the five dogs have insufficient bone-finding 
skills and need more training”, rather than the Keynesian response, “there are insufficient 
bones for the number of dogs”.     
 
Rising trade does not drive rising income inequality 
 
The theory of comparative advantage accounts for aggregate (consumption) gains from trade 
and neglects the distributional consequences. To see the significance of this neglect, take an 
example from Ian Fletcher.
26
 A country lowers trade barriers, then imports more clothes and 
exports more aircraft, in line with its comparative advantage. Its GDP goes up. For each 
million dollars of production, clothing requires one white collar worker and nine blue collar 
workers, aircraft require three white collar workers and seven blue collar workers. So demand 
for white collar workers goes up, demand for blue collar workers goes down; and their wages 
move in the same direction. But most workers are blue collar. So most workers face a fall in 
their employment conditions, even as GDP goes up, thanks to free trade moving the economy 
closer into line with its comparative advantage.  Dani Rodrik calculates that freeing up trade in 
the US shuffles five dollars to different groups for every one dollar of gain in GDP.
27
   
 
Trade remains balanced 
 
The theory assumes that trade remains balanced between the trade partners.
28
 The 
exchange rate is assumed to adjust so that relative cost differentials (due to differences 
between countries in their relative factor endowments) are translated into relative price 
differentials across borders, which lead profit-seeking producers to specialize in line with 
comparative advantage. If one country’s absolutely advantaged goods (think China) start to 
flood the markets of others (think Brazil), exchange rates will adjust sufficiently to ensure that 
before long comparative advantage dominates absolute advantage, and trade returns to 
                                                          
24
 David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson, 2016, “The China shock: learning from labor market 
adjustment to large changes in trade”, NBER WP 21906, January, www.nber.org/papers/w21906, 
emphasis added. 
25
 David Autor, David Dorn and Gordon Hanson, 2013, “The China syndrome: local labor market effects 
of import competition in the United States”, American Economic Review, 103 (6): 2121-68, at 2139. 
26
 Ian Fletcher, 2017, Free Trade Doesn’t Work, p. 109 
27
 Dani Rodrik, 1997, Has Globalization Gone Too Far?, Washington: Institute for International 
Economics, p. 30. 
28
  “In trade theory, it is standard to assume that trade is balanced”.   David Autor, David Dorn and 
Gordon Hanson, 2016, “The China shock: learning from labor market adjustment to large changes in 
trade”, NBER WP 21906, January, www.nber.org/papers/w21906, p. 12. 
real-world economics review, issue no. 79 
subscribe for free 
 
52 
 
balance. (Analytically, the adjustment could also occur through wage and price changes. But 
these are even more implausible in the modern world than exchange rate changes.) 
 
Underlying the invocation of the balancing exchange rate is an assumption that international 
trade is basically barter – producers barter goods among themselves. Money is simply a 
neutral medium of exchange, to lower transactions costs. The assumption rationalizes the 
discipline separation between “international trade”, with its specialists, and “international 
finance”, with its specialists (in exchange rates, payments systems and capital markets), with 
little communication between the two. 
 
The assumption that international trade is basically barter – and is balanced -- removes a 
fundamental dynamic of foreign exchange markets, a dynamic which explains why (1) a trade 
deficit need not produce an exchange rate devaluation, and (2) the exchange rate change 
need not restore balanced trade (no payments surpluses or deficits).  
 
Exchange rates are determined not only by relative flows of goods and services, but also by, 
often speculative, capital flows unrelated to the financing of trade. Capital flows can and do 
drive exchange rates far from levels at which trade would balance. They are driven by herd 
behavior based on “guesses” about how certain “news” will affect the behavior of financial 
market participants and thereby the direction of asset price movements, on which the 
speculation builds.
29
  
 
So countries with high inflation,  high interest rates, and large current account deficits can 
experience currency appreciation rather than depreciation (needed to reduce  current account 
deficits), as they become targets for carry trade “investors” (speculators) buying the domestic 
currency with money borrowed elsewhere at low interest rates.
30
  
 
The Trade and Development Report 2009, from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), sums up:   
 
“The most important lesson of the recent [2008] financial crisis is that 
financial markets do not ‘get the prices right’; they systematically overshoot or 
undershoot due to centralized information handling, which is quite different 
from the information collection of normal goods markets. In financial markets, 
nearly all participants react in a more or less uniform manner to the same set 
of ‘information’ or ‘news’, so that they wind or unwind their exposure to risk 
almost in unison. The currency market, in particular, causes results quite 
different from those envisaged by theory, such as an appreciation of the 
nominal exchange rate in countries that have high inflation rates over 
considerable periods of time.”
31
  
 
                                                          
29
 For overview analyses of the global financial system and efforts to “reform” it, see R. H. Wade, 2007, 
“A new financial architecture?”, New Left Review, 46, July-August, pp. 113-129;  2008, “Financial regime 
change?”,  New Left Review, 53, September-October, p.5- 22; Jakob Vestergaard, 2009, Discipline in 
the World Economy: International Finance and the End of Liberalism, Routledge.  
30
 See UNCTAD, passim, Trade and Development Report .  On Iceland as a case in point, see R. H. 
Wade and S. Sigurgeirsdottir, 2012, “Iceland’s rise, fall, stabilization and beyond”, Cambridge J. 
Economics, vol. 36, no. 1, January,  127-144; and R. H. Wade, 2009,  “Iceland as Icarus”, Challenge, 
52, 3, May-June, pp. 5-33. 
31
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Empirically, we know that, since the global liberalization of capital flows in the late 1970s, 
trade imbalances have persisted for long periods, together with high exchange rate volatility – 
which can have the effect of jerking economies, and people, around like yo-yos. Yet the 
theory of comparative advantage assumes that exchange rate adjustment will occur by 
enough to keep trade balanced.  
 
Short-term efficiency gains cause higher long-run growth 
 
The theory of comparative advantage tells how countries can reap efficiency gains by 
reallocating their existing resources by moving to freer trade. It is silent on the effects of the 
reallocation on long-run growth. If the reallocation results in the country moving out of 
activities rich in increasing returns to scale, or in technological linkages upstream and 
downstream, or in productivity gains due to physical proximity (an “industrial ecosystem”), it 
can harm growth.  
 
Take Ricardo’s famous example, showing that both England and Portugal gain by moving 
towards free trade, resulting in England specializing in textiles and Portugal in wine,  
consumption of both being higher in both countries than in the absence of trade. That is the 
end of the comparative advantage story.  But of course, now England has the textile industry, 
with its spillover links to the industry for steam engines and machine tools, which provides 
England with a platform to enter many other state-of-the-art sectors (stretching its 
comparative advantage). Portugal has wine, whose technology has not changed for hundreds 
of years and whose linkages to other sectors are thin. Good for England, bad for Portugal. 
And in fact, decades before Ricardo wrote, England and Portugal had switched to largely free 
trade in these products. Portugal’s promising textile industry was wiped out, and English (very 
mobile) capital, including Ricardo’s family’s, took control of Portugal’s vineyards as their 
owners went into debt with London banks.
32
 Portugal fell rapidly into the ranks of Europe’s 
poorest countries. Ricardo knew all this very well. He was an English gentleman, financier 
and Member of Parliament, and his theory of comparative advantage was a mask for 
advancing the emerging hegemon’s  national interest against others’.
33
 
     
 
V. Globalization in question: the economic evidence is ambiguous 
 
Now to focus more directly on empirical evidence. As noted, during the past several decades 
globalization – including freer trade and capital mobility – has led to production specialization 
broadly in line with the theory of comparative advantage. Adrian Wood explains with 
reference to 1985-2015,  
 
“In skill-abundant developed countries, manufacturing became more  
skill-intensive. In land-scarce developing East Asia, labour-intensive 
manufacturing expanded, especially in China. In land-abundant developing 
regions, however, manufacturing stagnated or declined, while in land-scarce 
                                                          
32
 Ian Fletcher, 2017, Free Trade Doesn’t Work, p. 114. 
33
 For an account of how western states today manage to maintain their dominant position in 
international economic organizations and steer these organizations to champion the great globalization 
consensus, see R. H. Wade, 2013, “The art of power maintenance: how western states keep the lead in 
global organizations”, Challenge, 56, 1, January-February, pp. 5-39.  
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South Asia manufacturing was held back by low literacy and weak 
infrastructure.”
34
   
 
However, this is a very broad empirical pattern of the factor-intensity of production and 
exports. The champions of free trade and more globalization make much grander and more 
normative claims about benefits far exceeding costs. They are inclined to overstate the 
benefits of free trade and globalization and underestimate the costs (even when confined to 
material benefits and costs, as in GDP, and especially when extended to employment).  
 
We saw earlier how globalization champions – such as the WTO and the World Bank – tend 
to attribute “all good things” to rising levels of economic globalization. Recall the World Bank 
saying, “openness to international trade, based on largely neutral incentives, was the critical 
factor in East Asia’s rapid growth”. No ambiguity:  “[L]argely neutral incentives… was the 
critical factor” (emphasis added).  Nothing in the World Bank study comes close to validating 
this claim. Also, recall the WTO saying that “global integration… has been one of the greatest 
contributors to economic growth and the relief of poverty in mankind’s history”.  Not to forget 
Renarto Ruggiero, former head of the WTO, declaring, “trade integration is not just a recipe 
for growth but also security and peace, as history has shown.” 
 
Globalization champions tend to assume that – while  globalization certainly brings aggregate 
benefits larger than costs – sectional interests adversely affected by international competition 
can successfully lobby the (often predatory) state for less globalization and more protection, 
at cost to the more diffuse (therefore less organizable ) “general or societal interest”. So 
globalization champions dismiss critics as not understanding the theory or as speaking for 
vested interests.
35
 
 
By way of critique, we can start with Paul Krugman’s point:  “The first thing you need to know 
is that almost everyone exaggerates the importance of trade policy.”
36
 This is a surprise 
coming from an economist who won the so-called Nobel Prize in Economics
37
 for his work on 
trade theory.  
 
Dani Rodrik affirms that,  
 
“Countries that have done well in the post-war period are those that have 
been able to formulate a domestic investment strategy to kick-start growth 
and those that have had the appropriate institutions to handle external 
shocks, not those that have relied on reduced barriers to trade and capital 
flows”.
38
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 Adrian Wood, 2017, “Variation in structural change around the world, 1985–2015”, abstract. 
35
 This section draws on Graham Dunkley, 2016, One World Mania: A Critical Guide to Free Trade, 
Financialization and Global Integration, Zed Books. 
36
 Paul Krugman, 2015, “TPP at the NABE”,  New York Times, 11 March. 
37
 Why “so-called”?  See Philip Mirowski, “The neoliberal ersatz Nobel Prize”, paper for presentation to 
conference on The Road from Mont Pelerin II, December 2015. Krugman was honored for showing how 
the well-known real-world phenomenon of increasing returns could be incorporated into formal trade 
models, which previously had been driven only by comparative advantage. Remarkable is that this 
incorporation happened so recently, given that since the early 20
th
 century business leaders competed 
by building companies big enough to drive down costs through economies of scale and speed 
sufficiently to establish monopoly positions.  
38
 Dani Rodrik, 1999, The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work, 
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Francisco Rodriguez summarizes literature on the link between openness and growth, and 
finds that six major measures of openness are only weakly if at all correlated with growth (and 
the causality could go both ways).  Also, most growth accelerations are not correlated with 
trade openings.
39
 
 
Global growth has fallen steadily every decade since the 1960s – from over five percent in the 
1960s to under three percent over the 2000s. Yet measures of economic integration between 
national economies show a fairly steady increase during these decades. 
 
Many developing countries had their fastest post-World War II growth during their period of 
“import substitution” with managed trade – which the reigning elite consensus treats as 
always harmful to the national interest and the global interest.  The consensus ignores the 
mechanism of managed trade in East Asia: the combination of strong encouragement to 
export certain products and strong encouragement to replace imports in certain other 
products, complemented by strong encouragement to invest and re-invest within the national 
territory. The result was that highly managed trade and capital flows (until the 1990s) helped 
to generate unusually  fast and sustained growth, which sucked in rising volumes of imports in 
the less-protected sectors. The incentive regime restrained imports of (especially luxury) 
consumer goods while facilitating imports of advanced capital goods. Closely managed trade 
went with fast growth of trade.
40
      
 
Whatever one concludes from these trends, it cannot be that trade liberalization tends to 
generate faster growth. At most, a step up in trade liberalization could be expected to produce 
a small, one-off increase in GDP, but there is no evidence that it reliably generates faster 
growth. 
 
In short, ample evidence is at hand with which to challenge the great globalization consensus. 
Together with the critique of comparative advantage theory, the evidence suggests we should 
consider an alternative line of argument to the mainstream’s core proposition: namely, the 
aggregate costs of the present level of trade and capital integration outweigh benefits; but 
sectional interests – especially MNCs and elites vested to international capital – press states 
for always more openness against the “general interest” (defined not just in terms of 
consumption but also employment). See the Barnevik and Arnault quotes above.  “Free trade 
agreements” like the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs), are a case in point. 
 
Indeed, a defining moment in the death of “the nation” as an economic and social protection 
entity in the US came in 1992 with the signing of NAFTA, by which the US, Canada and 
Mexico took a giant step towards a single economic unit (from “shallow” to “deep integration”). 
US workers undertook mass protests against it, accurately forecasting large-scale job losses 
at home, to no avail.  Barak Obama, before being elected US president in 2008, declared,  
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August. 
40
 Robert H. Wade, 1990 (2004),  Governing the Market;  Wade, 1993, “Managing trade: Taiwan and 
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“… entire cities have been devastated by trade pacts. I don’t think NAFTA 
has been good for America, and I never have.”
41
  
 
NAFTA has brought large material gains to shareholders and top executives of US and 
Canadian MNCs and to their dependent Mexican counterparts. It has also stimulated FDI into 
Mexico, and manufactured exports from Mexico. But Mexico’s growth has been sluggish since 
the 1990s, behind most other countries in Latin America. Average real wages have fallen to 
the point where the average real wage in Mexico City is below Shanghai. In a recent poll in 
Mexico, only 20% of respondents believed that NAFTA had been good for Mexican 
consumers and businesses. A Mexican economist noted,  
 
“as a development strategy, it should have led to higher sustained growth, 
generated well-paid salaries and reduced the gap between Mexico and the 
United States. It has remained well below what was hoped for.”  
 
Of course, the fault is not all due to NAFTA. The government and the domestic private sector 
have failed to increase investment in R&D, regulations remain burdensome, and banks have 
lent less than their Latin American counterparts, leaving small and medium enterprises 
scrambling for credit.
42
   
 
 
VI. Globalization in question: the political evidence is ambiguous 
 
 The discussion of NAFTA takes us to the political effects of trade liberalization and capital 
mobility. The core point is that as the dominant private economic agents detached from their 
domestic markets, shareholders and top executives of MNCs lost the idea of belonging to a 
nation, the idea of a basic solidarity with their people, including employees – because their 
sales and profits no longer depended mostly on the domestic market. As Robert Blecker says,  
 
“Although the US economy has been running large trade deficits that 
represent net losses of jobs in tradeables industries, US-based corporations 
have no such large deficits and have profited immensely from their foreign 
operations.”
43
    
 
Western states under strong influence from business lobbies have been unwilling to protect 
the public from goods and services produced in cheap labor countries; justifying their 
unwillingness by faith that globalization – specifically, free trade and investment – will benefit 
“all (hard working) families” in the longer run. 
44
  
 
A cartoon in the New York Times captures the point obliquely. A private jetplane lands at an 
airport, the red carpet is rolled out, down the gangplank walks the chief executive, who 
declares to his companion,  
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 Quoted in S. Thornton, 2008, “Trade pact smolders in fiery campaign”, AFR, 31 March, www.afr.com.  
42
 A. Ahmed and E. Malkin, 2017, “Mexico doesn’t feel like winner in trade deal”, New York Times 
(International), January 6, p. 1. 
43
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“Why should my taxes pay for roads and bridges?… When I don’t really use 
them?” 
 
The cartoon illustrates that the rich now have so much income and wealth relative to the rest 
of the population that they can effectively live in orbits quite separate from those of the large 
majority, free from the downsides of globalization, and shape public policy to their liking on 
issues where their preferences diverge from those of the median voter.
45
 
  
Technology, particularly information and communication technology (ICT), probably accounts 
for a larger part of job losses in western manufacturing than imports from cheap labour 
sites.
46
  But what matters for political effects is perception, and it is easier for those displaced 
from well-paying manufacturing jobs into low-wage service jobs or no jobs at all to blame 
foreigners and foreign countries for their hardship than to blame amorphous technology or 
inanimate robots.  
 
Erosion of the idea of the nation as an economic solidarity entity (continuing since the 1980s) 
has gone with a second negative effect of globalization, namely, erosion of Center-left parties 
and movements all over the West. In the face of triumphant globalization ideology the Center-
Left has long tried to compete with the Right by (a) adopting similar neoliberal economic 
policies of deregulation, liberalization, privatization, downplaying “the nation” an economic 
unit, unlike Trump,  while (b) differentiating itself from the Right on “social” (or “moral”)  issues 
like abortion, gender equality, and gay rights. The strategy has had limited success, 
especially since the financial crisis of 2007-08. These “social” issues are not compelling for 
electoral majorities, whereas core issues of employment, income protection, and social 
protection, are compelling – yet the Center-Left hardly differs from the well-financed low-tax 
Right on this terrain.    
 
A third political effect of globalization is that, finding little comfort from the Center-Left,  those 
who feel disadvantaged, even humiliated, as they see all around the wealthy few making 
huge fortunes and living luxuriously, and as they see the state giving help to minorities and 
immigrants financed with their taxes,  grasp at comfort from people and parties who do speak 
the language of “the nation”, meaning “people like us”, and who promise to “support the 
people, not the elites”. Even when they see the billionaire leader appointing many billionaires 
to his cabinet. We noted earlier that this broad pattern is well-established in elections around 
the developed world in the wake of financial crises, not specific to the recent US election.  
  
 
VII. Why have economists been so committed to free trade and globalization?   
 
Why have the large majority of professional economists, especially in the academy and in 
western-dominated international organizations like the World Bank and IMF, been committed 
to free trade policy, downplaying theoretical and empirical weaknesses in order to remain so?  
                                                          
45
 Martin Gilens, 2014, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America, 
Princeton University Press.  And not to be missed, Keith Olbermann,  
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 Separating out the causal weight of “globalization” and “technology” on employment, wages and 
working conditions is difficult because they are so interrelated. Offshoring of manufacturing raises the 
supply of people seeking employment in service sector jobs, and the spread of information technology 
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The teaching of economics in just about all universities of the western world, and in large 
parts of the developing world, socializes students into belief in the rightness of the “market” 
paradigm, and the more “rigorous” the training the more thoroughly socialized they become.
47
  
The paradigm focuses on price competitiveness – free labor markets, flexible prices, free 
international trade – as the key to national competitiveness. It treats the market system as 
“self-organizing”, firms being essentially passive except for competing in price. It treats 
technology as external to production, as something which firms can buy on the market. It has 
no built-in process of innovation, no conception of an “industrial ecosystem” of firms 
competing and cooperating with each other.
48
 With all these things stripped out, the culture of 
the profession elevates belief in comparative advantage and free trade as the litmus test of 
competence to be an economist, as the earlier quote from Krugman suggests.  
 
The market paradigm fits the larger “conservative” worldview, which sees the market as 
‘natural’ and the realm of ‘freedom’, the state as artificial and the realm of coercion (often 
predatory coercion). This worldview is not just cognitive (“how the world works”), but intensely 
normative (“how the world should work”, “the right order of society”).
49
 In the market 
paradigm, the role of government is limited to “correcting market failures”; so state 
“interventions” in the market have to be carefully justified case by case. Many conservatives 
do accept the case for taxes to curb some “externalities”, such as pollution taxes to 
discourage private agents from polluting the environment. Some would even favor a carbon-
emissions tax, but not emission regulations (as in Obama’s Clean Power Plan).
50
  
 
In short, the consensus belief in free trade stems from the wider cognitive and normative 
belief – inculcated in economics education -- that the key to economic development lies in 
improving the scope of, and the institutions of, exchange. Government should strengthen 
property rights, foster the rule of law, and do what is necessary to align domestic prices with 
international prices (which means, free trade); and then, having put the right incentive 
structure in place, get out of the way, allowing the production structure to emerge as the result 
of profit-seeking investment decisions by private firms, domestic and foreign equally.  
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The dominance of the market paradigm has hardly been challenged by the new phase of 
capitalism associated with the hyper-growth of the financial sector and turbo-charged by ICTs.  
Money funds and shareholders are pressing companies to give priority to success targets 
such as profits, dividends, and share prices; and to shift production to cheaper sites offshore, 
using investable funds at home to buy back shares (to boost share prices), as distinct from 
invest in R&D and training. Stock markets now tend to reward dividends and share buy-
backs, not investment.
51,52
 
 
We see the impacts of the market paradigm in the fracturing of the European Union and 
Eurozone, gripped by the German and other northwest European countries’ conviction that 
their own economic success is due to their devotion to the market paradigm – flexible costs 
and prices, small budget deficits, low inflation, and private utilities. They urge the peripheral 
countries to follow in their footsteps, with fiscal austerity, labour market deregulation, and 
privatization. They miss the point that their own economic success comes from a very 
different production and employment system than exists in most of the periphery (Greece, 
Portugal and southern Italy, for example).
53
  
 
Both the contrast in economic performance within the European Union, and my critique of the 
globalization agenda, can be understood in terms of the much less favored ‘production’ 
paradigm. As Ricardo is the source of the market paradigm, Charles Babbage is the source of 
the production paradigm, in the form of his 1832 book, On the Economy of Machinery and 
Manufacturers.
54
  His successors included Alfred Marshall, Allyn Young, Edith Penrose and 
George Richardson. It is a fair bet that most economics PhD students in Anglo universities 
have never heard of these people, let alone read them.
55
  
 
The production paradigm says that the core mechanism of how economies transform (or not) 
lies in the combination of production capabilities, business organization, and economic 
governance; or what Michael Best calls the “capability triad”.
56
  Economies with high capability 
pivot on a sufficient density of “entrepreneurial” firms which pull basic and applied R&D or 
production and marketing ideas from MNCs with branches in the economy in question, into 
innovation in products, processes, organizations, and marketing. These entrepreneurial firms 
do not emerge by themselves as a natural result of a well-working market. Their own internal 
capacity development requires a larger ecosystem of finance, skills and S&T partnerships; 
which depends on trust in social interactions, and therefore physical and/or cultural proximity.  
The government (national or regional) is the organizer, the steward of the infrastructure 
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needed to support this ecosystem. “Macro stabilization” has a supporting, not driving  
role. Well-known examples are Boston’s Route 128, Silicon Valley, the Third Italy, and 
Germany’s mittelstand and similarly organized small and medium enterprises (less than 500 
employees) in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, Switzerland.
57
 The most spectacular 
transformation of all is Singapore, which, like Ireland and Malaysia, aggressively invited in 
MNCs and also, unlike those cases, carefully developed national capacity to pull more 
complex production and technology from corporate headquarters to local operating divisions 
in Singapore and from there to national firms.   
 
From this point of view, the standard argument that: “it is OK, in terms of the national interest, 
for firms to offshore their ‘scale-up’ production provided ‘start-ups’ with their knowledge stay 
at home” is mistaken, because (a) innovation depends on building on experience of 
production, “learning while doing”, and (b) scale-ups are where the jobs are, not the start-
ups.
58
   
 
Germany’s economic performance, and in particular its large trade surpluses, comes out of 
the production system codified in the production paradigm – combined with the longstanding 
agreement between government, business and labor to hold down wages and domestic 
demand.  
 
Britain, on the other hand, is a sad case of the costs of following the market paradigm.  British 
manufacturing (with exceptions) was slow (compared to northwest Europe) to introduce 
interchangeable parts, a culture of “continuous improvement”, profit-sharing reward 
incentives, team-based multi-skilled work organization, minimal separation between 
managers and workers, and heavy investment in vocational education. Britain remained stuck 
with piece-rate incentive systems, elaborate job classifications, sharp hierarchical separation 
between managers and workers, even as its manufacturing firms lost more and more market 
share.
59
 By way of compensation, the government undertook ad hoc industrial policy with 
subsidies, tax concessions and material infrastructure driven not by a national or regional 
strategy but by electoral calculation and intense lobbying in the shadows. 
 
British-owned road car manufacturers were wiped out by foreign firms assembling in Britain – 
which imported two thirds of their parts and components in place of domestic production. The 
British government did little to encourage them to deepen their production in Britain, saying, in 
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the spirit of the market paradigm, “If they can get cheaper parts elsewhere, then they should 
do it”. The Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese governments would have had a more 
developmental mindset.  
 
Britain’s low level of output per hour productivity relative to its peers (a bit over three quarters 
of the US, German and French levels, about the same as Italy, and stagnant since 2007) has 
been the subject of much research and anguished commentary. The conclusions typically 
point to: (1) poor infrastructure (rated by the OECD as second worst in the G7); (2) low 
investment in R&D (at 1.7 percent of GDP in private and public R&D, well below the OECD 
average, let alone the leaders on over 3 percent of GDP); and (3) a relatively unskilled 
population, which cannot drive productivity forward.
60
  
 
Strangely overlooked as causes of Britain’s low productivity are: (4) British companies have 
for two centuries invested relatively heavily overseas compared to at home (the opposite in 
Germany, Japan, South Korea). (5) The economy has become dominated by finance, with its 
demands that British companies give priority to success targets such as profits, dividends, 
and share prices; and use investable funds at home to buy back shares so as to boost share 
prices. Finance has also had a backwash effect on the “real” economy, attracting highly 
skilled people to work in finance by offering remuneration many times that available 
elsewhere. (6) Britain’s captains of industry and its financial magnates are zealous champions 
of the market paradigm. So they rubbished the government’s green paper on industrial 
strategy published in early 2017, saying that the solution to lagging productivity is not 
“industrial strategy” but cuts in regulations – even though OECD measures show that Britain’s 
labor and product market regulation is low and about the same as in the US.
61
  
 
Emphasising the costs of the last three points would challenge the core of the market 
paradigm in a way that emphasizing the first three does not.  Meanwhile, all the attention is on 
the costs of Brexit, which will be small compared to the loss from low productivity. 
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
It may be that, 
 
“President Trump, animated by private motives as yet undisclosed, wants to 
bring about a Russian-American axis that would enfeeble Nato, destroy the 
European Union and dominate a continent reduced to politically dysfunctional 
national fragments… Operating under the ‘America First’ rubric, Donald 
Trump has instantly turned the US into a rogue state. Internationally agreed 
rules on trade, territories, refugees, climate and disarmament are, it seems, 
to be treated as no longer binding on America.”
62
 
 
The problem is that branding Trump “populist” goes with knee-jerk condemnation of 
everything he favors. Here is Philip Stephens of the Financial Times: “No one should pretend, 
though, that the populists have the answers. Protectionism impoverishes everyone.”
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  As in 
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all the Financial Times’ commentary, he leaves “protectionism” completely unbounded, his 
blanket condemnation inviting the reader to suppose it means something close to autarky – 
an obviously stupid trade regime.   
 
I have used Trump’s skepticism about free trade as an excuse for questioning the crown jewel 
status of the theory of comparative advantage and the said-to-be-rigorously derived-and-
empirically-well-supported policy of free trade as best for each country and for the world.  The 
reigning belief that all countries should practice free or almost free trade, and that the purpose 
of  “free trade agreements” and international organizations like the WTO is to move public 
policy towards freer trade – and deeper economic integration more generally – can be 
challenged on several grounds set out in sections IV–VI, not repeated here.   
 
The standard response to these challenges is:  
 
“Policy must target the problems directly, and not use protection. The trade-
off between free trade and employment must be handled by more social 
protection and more skill training, while keeping (or moving to) free trade and 
deep integration. This is best for all.”  
 
But what if these policy responses are barely forthcoming? Moneyed politics works strongly 
against them, as we see in the US’s threadbare social protection system.  
 
The British government gives another example. Soon after Theresa May became the Prime 
Minister of the Conservative government in mid 2016 she declared to the Conservative Party 
conference,  
 
“Our economy should work for everyone, but if your pay has stagnated for 
several years in a row and fixed items of spending keep going up, it doesn’t 
feel like it’s working for you.”  
 
She was right. But her government inherited – and crucially, maintained – tax and benefit 
plans which have the opposite effect; which give substantial tax cuts to the relatively well-off, 
and give substantial benefits cuts to those of working age. As Martin Wolf says,  
 
“The government has decided to give greater priority to… the better off than 
to the relatively worse off.”
64
   
 
In short, making a level playing field does not ensure that the players turn up to play. Creating 
effective institutions of exchange in conditions of free trade does not tilt the production-
business organization-economic governance capability triad towards innovation and 
expansion of higher value-added activities. The government can play a crucial role in securing 
the latter, including by managing trade as part of a larger investment strategy.  But first we 
have to dispense with the saturated scorn with which managed trade is dismissed as 
“protectionism”.  
 
All inter-state agreements imply some sacrifice of national autonomy. Agreements on health, 
environment, human rights, refugees, development, tax evasion, minimum top marginal tax 
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thresholds and the like, have a high potential for mutual gains between the signatory states; 
they should be encouraged in the spirit of “cooperative internationalism”. Liberalization 
agreements on trade, investment, capital mobility and other domains of economics and 
finance typically have far-reaching, more ambivalent effects on the structures of production, 
employment and income distribution in which national populations live. They express the spirit 
of “integrative globalization”, which encourages governments to improve the conditions for 
markets in their country, remove limits on cross-border economic flows, and let the production 
and employment structures develop as they will on the basis of private profit-seeking 
competition between domestic and foreign firms equally.
65
 
 
Free trade is the sensible rule of thumb most of the time in most sectors. It is sensible 
because the efficiency gains are often real, even if the theory of comparative advantage over- 
generalizes them; and it is a simpler rule for any state and for inter-state agreements than 
rules for managed trade. But the argument made here about production and employment, in 
the context of economic growth rather than  static resource efficiency,  suggests that inter-
state agreements, including the rules of the WTO, should be revised to permit more 
government “leadership” and “followership” of the market – sometimes by leading the 
production structure into activities the private sector would not undertake on its own, 
sometimes by making bets on initiatives already underway in the private sector to assist those 
initiatives to scale up.
66
 This contrasts with the current situation, in which the WTO restricts 
the use of instruments relevant to developing countries’ efforts to upgrade the national 
production structure – including tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and direct industry subsidies – while 
allowing instruments relevant to advanced countries’ efforts to grow new activities on the 
world frontier, such as R&D subsidies. The WTO is, put crudely, an industrial upgrading 
device for advanced countries, an industrial downgrading device for developing countries.
67
   
President Trump surely does not intend his skepticism of free trade to benefit developing 
countries, but it gives the potential for others to modify international rules towards more 
“policy space”.    
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